Security, Privacy and Abuse Prevention
The Internet and the World Wide Web have brought many changes that provide huge benefits, in particular by giving people easy access to information that was previously unavailable, or simply hard to find. Unfortunately, these changes have raised many new challenges in the security of computer systems and the protection of information against unauthorized access and abusive usage. At Google, our primary focus is the user, and his/her safety. We have people working on nearly every aspect of security, privacy, and anti-abuse including access control and information security, networking, operating systems, language design, cryptography, fraud detection and prevention, spam and abuse detection, denial of service, anonymity, privacy-preserving systems, disclosure controls, as well as user interfaces and other human-centered aspects of security and privacy. Our security and privacy efforts cover a broad range of systems including mobile, cloud, distributed, sensors and embedded systems, and large-scale machine learning.
Recent Publications
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Modern user interfaces are complex composites, with elements originating from various sources, such as the operating system, apps, a web browser, or websites. Many security and privacy models implicitly depend on users correctly identifying an element's source, a concept we term ''surface attribution.'' Through two large-scale vignette-based surveys (N=4,400 and N=3,057), we present the first empirical measurement of this ability.
We find that users struggle, correctly attributing UI source only 55% of the time on desktop and 53% on mobile. Familiarity and strong brand cues significantly improve accuracy, whereas UI positioning, a long-held security design concept especially for browsers, has minimal impact. Furthermore, simply adding a ''Security & Privacy'' brand cue to Android permission prompts failed to improve attribution. These findings demonstrate a fundamental gap in users' mental models, indicating that relying on them to distinguish trusted UI is a fragile security paradigm.
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Who is At-Risk? Surveying the Prevalence of Risk Factors and Tech-Facilitated Attacks in the United States
Sharon Heung
Claire Weizenegger
Mo Houtti
Tara Matthews
Ashley Walker
2026
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A growing body of qualitative research has identified contextual risk factors that elevate people’s chances of experiencing digital-safety attacks. However, the lack of quantitative data on the population level distribution of these risk factors prevents policymakers and tech companies from developing targeted, evidence-based interventions to improve digital safety. To address this gap, we surveyed 5,001 adults in the United States to analyze: (1) the frequency of and relationship between digital-safety attacks (e.g., scams, harassment, account hacking), and (2) how these attacks align with 10 contextual risk factors. Nearly half of our respondents identify as resource constrained, which significantly correlates with higher likelihood of experiencing four common attacks. We also present qualitative insights to expand our understanding of the factors beyond the existing literature (e.g., “prominence” included high-visibility roles in local communities). This study provides the first large-scale quantitative analysis correlating digital-safety attacks with contextual risk factors and demographics.
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The rapid expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT) and smart home ecosystems has led to a fragmented landscape of user data management across consumer electronics (CE) such as Smart TVs, gaming consoles, and set-top boxes. Current onboarding processes on these devices are characterized by high friction due to manual data entry and opaque data-sharing practices. This paper introduces the User Data Sharing System (UDSS), a platform-agnostic framework designed to facilitate secure, privacy-first PII (Personally Identifiable Information) exchange between device platforms and third-party applications. Our system implements a Contextual Scope Enforcement (CSE) mechanism that programmatically restricts data exposure based on user intent—specifically distinguishing between Sign-In and Sign-Up workflows. Unlike cloud-anchored identity standards such as FIDO2/WebAuthn, UDSS is designed for shared, device-centric CE environments where persistent user-to-device bind-ing cannot be assumed. We further propose a tiered access model that balances developer needs with regulatory compliance (GDPR/CCPA). A proof-of-concept implementation on a reference ARMv8 Linux-based middleware demonstrates that UDSS reduces user onboarding latency by 65% and measurably reduces PII over-exposure risk through protocol-enforced data minimization. This framework provides a standardized approach to identity management in the heterogeneous CE market.
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Uncovering Relationships between Android Developers, User Privacy, and Developer Willingness to Reduce Fingerprinting Risks
Proceedings of the 2026 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI ’26) (2026)
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The major mobile platforms, Android and iOS, have introduced changes that restrict user tracking to improve user privacy, yet apps continue to covertly track users via device fingerprinting. We study the opportunity to improve this dynamic with a case study on mobile fingerprinting that evaluates developers’ perceptions of how well platforms protect user privacy and how developers perceive platform privacy interventions. Specifically, we study developers’ willingness to make changes to protect users from fingerprinting and how developers consider trade-offs between user privacy and developer effort. We do this via a survey of 246 Android developers, presented with a hypothetical Android change that protects users from fingerprinting at the cost of additional developer effort.
We find developers overwhelmingly (89%) support this change, even when they anticipate significant effort, yet prefer the change be optional versus required. Surprisingly, developers who use fingerprinting are six times more likely to support the change, despite being most impacted by it. We also find developers are most concerned about compliance and enforcement. In addition, our results show that while most rank iOS above Android for protecting user privacy, this distinction significantly reduces among developers very familiar with fingerprinting. Thus there is an important opportunity for platforms and developers to collaboratively build privacy protections, and we present actionable ways platforms can facilitate this.
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"It didn’t feel right but I needed a job so desperately": Understanding People's Emotions & Help Needs During Financial Scams
G. Jake Chanenson
Tara Matthews
Jessica McClearn
Sarah Meiklejohn
Mia Hassoun
2026
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Online financial scams represent a long-standing and serious threat for which people seek help. We present a study to understand people’s in situ motivations for engaging with scams and the help needs they express before, during, and after encountering a scam. We identify the main emotions scammers exploited (e.g., fear, hope) and characterize how they did so. We examine factors—such as financial insecurity and legal precarity—which elevate people’s risk of engaging with specific scams and experiencing harm. We indicate when people sought help and describe their help-seeking needs and emotions at different stages of the scam. We discuss how these needs could be met through the design of contextually-specific prevention, diagnostic, mitigation, and recovery interventions.
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Generative AI (GenAI) is evolving from standalone tools to interconnected ecosystems that integrate chatbots, cloud platforms, and third-party services. While this ecosystem model enables personalization and extended services, it also introduces complex information flows and amplifies privacy risks. Existing solutions focus on system-level protections, offering little support for users to make meaningful privacy choices. To address this gap, we conducted two vignette-based survey studies with 486 participants and a followup interview study with 16 participants. We also explored users’ needs and preferences for privacy choice design across both GenAI personalization and data-sharing. Our results reveal paradoxical patterns: participants sometimes trusted third-party ecosystems more for personalization but perceived greater control in first-party ecosystems when data was shared externally. We discuss design implications for privacy choice interfaces that enhance transparency, control, and trust in GenAI ecosystems.
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